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International Human-Rights Low and Sovereignty
International human-rights law, by definition, limits state sovereignty: it restricts how governments may treat
their own citizens within their own borders. In the wake of the explosive growth of international human-rights law
in the second half of the 20th century, what space remains for state sovereignty? To what extent does
sovereignty shield states from international human-rights norms and enforcement? These questions must be
viewed in historical context. The international legal boundary between states' rights and human rights is not
fixed. Long ago, the Permanent Court of International Justice-the judicial arm of the League of Nations and the
precursor to the present International Court of Justice-recognized that "the question whether a certain matter is
or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends on the
development of international relations." In recent decades international relations concerning both sovereignty
and rights have developed rapidly. Before examining rights, we must first examine the evolving realities of
sovereignty.
Defining Sovereignty
There is no single internationally recognized definition of sovereignty. For the purpose of human rights,
sovereignty may be defined from both international and domestic perspectives. In its international dimension,
sovereignty is the right of a state to rule itself and those who live within its territory; to choose its own
constitution, form of government, and economic system; to write and enforce its own laws; to exercise a
territorial monopoly on publicly sanctioned use of force through its police and military; to set its own taxes and
allocate the spending of government revenues; to exercise police powers to regulate the economy and society;
and to enter into agreements with other states. A state that can do all these things, unfettered by outside
dictates or interference, enjoys full sovereignty; a state that is not free to exercise these powers is, to that
degree, not sovereign.
For the purposes of international human-rights law, the most critical element of sovereignty is the right of a state
to treat its citizens within its borders as it sees fit, free of outside intervention. Under early 2 Oth-century
international law, one core element of sovereignty was, according to Lassa Oppenheim, a state's authority to
"treat its subjects according to [its] discretion."
Pact of Customs
The turn of the century reveals sovereignty to be unprecedented and nearly universally formal in law, in a real
world in which few governments are free to exercise it. Legal claims of sovereignty amount to bargaining chips,
but not trump cards, for governments to play in negotiations with outsiders over the conduct of their most
important internal affairs.

State sovereignty, in one sense, is hopelessly at odds with international human-rights law. International humanrights law imposes externally defined norms and enforcement on how a state treats citizens within its borders.
As Kipling would say, "Ne'er the twain shall meet," or so it would appear.
In practice, of course, this pure polarity is never attained. Few governments in modern times have ever had
complete license to govern their peoples as they saw fit. Yet the contradiction between sovereignty and
international human rights is more than theoretical. It can be seen in the relative immunity enjoyed by powerful
states-those which possess, in fact, the greatest degree of sovereignty from international humanrights
enforcement. The United States, for example, formally accepts international human-rights norms but
systematically rejects effective external enforcement. China routinely rebuffs even the mildest efforts to examine
its record before the UN Commission on Human Rights. Regional powers such as Brazil, India, Nigeria, and
Saudi Arabia are considered "untouchable" by the Commission. And Russia's recent pounding of Chechen
civilians provoked little more than hand-waving by the international community.
Even weaker states invoke sovereignty as a pretext against international claims of human rights. Whenever
their records are criticized by the likes of Amnesty International or a UN Special Rapporteur, governments
typically protest the outside interference in their sovereign affairs.
A claim of sovereignty is often an effective shield. By invoking its legitimizing power, as well as its appeal to the
common interests of all states, a government raises the stakes in the debate. Other states may still agree to
overcome or pierce the claim of sovereignty, but the political and diplomatic obstacles to agreement are higher
and may not be overcome. In countless cases, claims of sovereignty in practice defeat claims of rights.
At the same time, however, state sovereignty is a powerful, even necessary instrument of international humanrights law. This is because sovereignty contains within it the seeds of its own diminution: a state free to decide
all matters pertaining to its affairs may decide to surrender a portion of its sovereignty. It has the sovereign right
to become less sovereign. Even if this proposition might once have been debatable, the practice of states in the
second half of the 20th century-not only in human rights but in trade, environment, arms control, and other
fields-has long since mooted any such debate.
The exercise by states of their sovereign right to surrender sovereignty has in fact become the most important
engine of expansion of international human-rights law. It began with the UN Charter, to which nearly all states
are party. It continued with the two most comprehensive UN human-rights treaties, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both
ratified by more than 140 of the 189 UN Member States.
The Covenants, in turn, are the core of a sprawling corpus of treaties ratified by comparable numbers of states.
The more important UN treaties protect the rights of children, women, and refugees, as well as ban torture,
genocide, and racial discrimination. The International Labor Organization has adopted major treaties on rights to
collective bargaining, and against forced labor or employment discrimination. The International Committee of
the Red Cross sponsored the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 protocols on international and noninternational armed conflict, requiring respect for basic human rights in wartime. Regionally, treaties with broad
coverage of mainly civil and political rights have been adopted in Europe, the Americas, and Africa.

By entering into such treaties, states have voluntarily created and submitted to most contemporary international
human-rights law. A role remains for customary international law that binds even those states that have not
joined a particular treaty. Most arguments for customary rights, however, rely heavily on treaties and on their
widespread ratification as evidence of the custom. Directly or indirectly, virtually the entire edifice of international
human-rights law is built on state sovereignty. Even the doctrine of jus cogens, by which certain norms-such as
the ban on genocide-are so fundamental that they override conflicting treaties, is itself the creature of a treaty,
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed in 1969.
In theory, states retain their sovereign rights to withdraw from treaties, but in practice they rarely do so.
Collectively, states have proven reluctant to deconstruct what they have built. State sovereignty, which has built
international human-rights law, is unlikely to demolish it.
Righting Global Wrongs
Even if relatively few states possessed real or even formal sovereignty prior to the founding of the United
Nations, those who had it guarded it jealously. Before World War II, with a few exceptions, no self-respecting
sovereign state would brook outside interference with its treatment of its own citizens within its own territory.
The potential of such a doctrine to shelter inhumanity reached its extreme in the case of Nazi Germany. As
early as 1933 a German Jew from Upper Silesia, invoking the minorities clauses of a German-Polish treaty,
complained to the League of Nations that he had been fired because of his Jewish descent. Germany
responded that the "Jewish question" fell exclusively within its domestic jurisdiction. Despite the treaty, no final
action was taken before Germany withdrew from the League.
Even the Final Solution, Hermann Goering would later claim at Nuremberg,"...was our right! We were a
sovereign State and that was strictly our business." Goering was wrong: the Holocaust was an international
affair, since its death trains crossed national borders. But if Germany had slaughtered only German Jews within
Germany, he would arguably have been right. This was tacitly confirmed at Nuremberg, where crimes against
humanity were prosecuted only if committed after the war began, in connection with war crimes or crimes
against peace.
The turning point came in 1945. Following the ghastly revelations of Nazi death camps, non-governmental
organizations, working together with Latin American and Asian nations demanding self-determination and racial
equality, succeeded in breaching the wall of state sovereignty. The UN Charter declares that the United Nations'
purpose includes "achiev[ing] international cooperation.. in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." It provides that
"the United Nations shall promote...universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental

freedoms..." and that "... all Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with
the Organization for the achievement" of those purposes.
This language was vague on both the scope of rights protected and on the obligations of states and the United
Nations. Moreover, the Charter left an escape clause, by stipulating that nothing in it "shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
But this clause was weak from the start: it did not specify that human rights are matters "essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction." And with human rights written all over the rest of the UN Charter, it was no longer
possible to contend that human rights were essentially domestic. The Charter thus opened the door to the
internationalization of rights. In the remainder of the 20th century, a parade of human-rights treaties marched
through its portals. In legal terms, no longer could sovereignty shield states from the claims of international
human-rights law.
Framework of Norms
The internationalization of rights proceeded in stages. First was the assertion of international jurisdiction over
human rights, accomplished by the UN Charter. UN exercise of that jurisdiction, however, proceeded cautiously.
It began in 1948 with the international articulation of norms in the form of the non-binding Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Next the Covenants of the 1960s and other treaties brought about the international
codification of rights in legally binding form. And finally the United Nations and other international bodies
developed a series of progressively more stringent enforcement measures.
By now, widely adopted humanrights treaties cover a broad range of social, political, and security issues.
Among them are such sensitive topics as the relations between parents and children, husbands and wives, and
employers and employees; freedom of the press and of religion; electoral systems; criminal justice procedures
and punishments; and the conduct of war and national security emergencies. With respect to norms, most
states have now conceded a significant measure of their sovereignty.
Legally Bound
But enforcement has developed at a far slower pace; one reason for the rapid acceptance of international
norms has been that few governments expected to take them seriously. Until the 1970s, except for political
debate, the United Nations had no generalized mechanisms of enforcement. In that decade the first modest
mechanisms came into being: self-reporting requirements by states party to treaties, and the possibility of public
condemnation of governments by UN political bodies.
The next stage brought more meaningful enforcement-independent of control by states, though still not binding.
Among these enforcement regimes were optional, nonbinding individual complaint procedures that now exist
under several major UN treaties, and special UN experts and working groups to provide public, ongoing
oversight of human rights in particular countries or of particular human-rights problems worldwide.
The most recent stage-binding enforcement-began mainly after the Cold War. It assumes a diversity of forms.
One is international criminal prosecution, at first through ad hoc international courts for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, and now through a permanent, global International Criminal Court, for which a treaty has been
opened for ratification. Another is "universal jurisdiction," by which third-party states may prosecute humanrights crimes committed in other nations, as in the case of General Pinochet, arrested in London on a Spanish
extradition warrant, for torture committed in Chile. Alternatively, damages may be awarded against humanrights violators by the courts of third-party states.
In addition to cases against individuals, binding enforcement may be undertaken through international litigation
against governments. Suits brought by victims of rights violations have progressively taken root in the Council of
Europe since the 1950s. They have had a foothold in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights since the late
1980s, and recently a new African Court of Human Rights has been agreed to and awaits ratification. Since the
1980s, governments have also occasionally sued other governments for human-rights violations in the
International Court of Justice. Of course, the fact that the resulting judgments are legally binding does not mean

that governments necessarily comply with them.
Other forms of enforcement may be binding in law or in fact. The incorporation of international norms in national
laws and enforcement by national courts is one form, but this is generally weakest in those countries which
need it most. Another approach, multinational economic sanctions, are often ineffective. Denials of credit by
international financial agencies are only occasional while armed intervention is politically selective and often
occurs too late to be helpful.
In short, outside Europe, binding international enforcement remains the exception rather than the rule. In terms
of effectively enforceable norms, state sovereignty has yielded only grudgingly and modestly. While non-binding
enforcement by inter-governmental bodies, third-party governments, non-governmental organizations, the
press, and public opinion can exert pressure on a regime, it is usually not enough to overcome vital political or
security interests, or personal interests of government leaders. Even so, progress in the decade since the end
of the Cold War has been remarkable.
Bargaining Sovereignty
After half a century of the internationalization of human rights, states have exercised their sovereign right to
yield much to international norms, but little to international enforcement. States have lost exclusive jurisdiction
over human rights; their powers are contracted by globalization and international enforcement is expanding.
Even so, now and for the foreseeable future, states retain enough sovereign rights to use as bargaining chips in
most cases and usually to prevail when the stakes are high for their governments or their leaders. Protection of
rights thus depends on an ongoing process of negotiation between governments and domestic and international
actors. The goal of human-rights enforcement should not be to vanquish state sovereignty but to strengthen
international leverage while creating incentives for states to channel their sovereign powers toward greater
respect for human rights.
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